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Tag forgeryRecommendation systems and content-ﬁltering approaches based on annotations and ratings essentially rely on
users expressing their preferences and interests through their actions, in order to provide personalised content.
This activity, inwhich users engage collectively, has been named social tagging, and it is one of themost popular op-
portunities for users to engage online, and although it has opened new possibilities for application interoperability
on the semantic web, it is also posing new privacy threats. In fact, it consists in describing online or ofﬂine resources
by using free-text labels, i.e., tags, thereby exposing a user's proﬁle and activity to privacy attacks. As a result, users
maywish to adopt a privacy-enhancing strategy in order not to reveal their interests completely. Tag forgery is a pri-
vacy-enhancing technology consisting in generating tags for categories or resources that do not reﬂect the user's ac-
tual preferences too accurately. Bymodifying their proﬁle, tag forgerymay have a negative impact on the quality of
the recommendation system, thus protecting user privacy to a certain extent but at the expenses of utility loss. The
impact of tag forgery on content-based recommendation isconsequently investigated in a real-world application
scenariowhere different forgery strategies are evaluated, and the resulting loss in utility ismeasured and compared.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Recommendation and information-ﬁltering systems have been devel-
oped to predict users' preferences, and to eventually use the resulting pre-
dictions for a variety of services, from search engines to resources
suggestions andadvertisement. The system functionality relies onusers im-
plicitly or explicitly revealing their activity and personal preferences, which
are ultimately used to generate personalised recommendations.
Such annotation activity has been called social tagging and it consists
of users collectively assigning keywords (i.e., tags) to real life objects
and web-based resources that they ﬁnd interesting. Social tagging is
currently one of the most popular online activities. Therefore, different
functionalities have been implemented in various online services, such
as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram, to encourage their
users to tag resources collectively.
Tagging involves classifying resources according to one's experience.
Unlike traditional methods where classiﬁcation happens by choosing
labels from a controlled vocabulary, in social tagging systems users free-
ly choose and combine terms. This is usually referred to as free-form tag
annotation, and the resulting emergent information organisation has
been called folksonomy.vier.parra@entel.upc.edu
ollo@entel.upc.edu
. This is an open access article underThis scenario has opened new possibilities for semantic interoperability
in web applications. Tags, in fact, allow autonomous agents to categorise
web resources easily, obtaining some form of semantic representation of
their content. However, annotatingonline resources poses potential privacy
risks, since users reveal their preferences, interests and activities. Theymay
then wish to adopt privacy-enhancing strategies, masquerading their real
interests to a certain extent, by applying tags to categories or resources
that do not reﬂect their actual preferences. Speciﬁcally, Tag forgery is a
privacy-enhancing technology (PET) designed to protect user privacy, by
creating bogus tags in order to disguise real user's interests. As a
perturbation-basedmechanism, tag forgery poses an inherent trade-off be-
tween privacy and usability. Users are able to obtain a high level of protec-
tion by increasing their forgery activity, but this can substantially affect the
quality of the recommendation.
The primary goal of this work is to investigate the effects of tag forg-
ery to content-based recommendation in a real-world application sce-
nario, studying the interplay between the degree of privacy and the
potential degradation of the quality of the recommendation. An experi-
mental evaluation is performed on a dataset extracted from Delicious
[1], a social bookmarking platform for web resources. In particular,
three different tag forgery strategies have been evaluated, namely:
optimised tag forgery [2], uniform tag forgery and TrackMeNot (TMN)
[3], the last consists of simulating a possible TMN like agent, periodically
issuing randomised tags according to popular categories.
Using the dataset and a measure of utility for the recommendation
system, a threefold experiment is conducted to evaluate how thethe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Hence, we simulate a scenario in which users only apply one of the dif-
ferent tag forgery strategies considered. Measures of the recommender
performances are computed before and after the application of each
PET, obtaining an experimental study of the compromise between pri-
vacy and utility.
To thebest of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst systematic evaluation of
the impact of applying perturbation-based privacy technologies on the
usability of content-based recommendation systems. For this evalua-
tion, both suitable privacy and usability metrics are required. In partic-
ular, as suggested by Parra et al. [4], the KL divergence is used as
privacymetric of the user proﬁle; while the quality of the recommenda-
tion is computed following themethodology proposed byCantador el al.
[5].
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the state of
the art. Section 3 describes the adversary model considered. Section 4
explains a possible practical application of the proposed PET through
the implementation of a communication module. Section 5 discusses
the evaluation methodology and obtained results. Section 6 presents
the conclusions that can be derived from the presented results, while
also introducing future research lines.
2. State of the art
In recommendation systems employing tags or in any system
allowing resource annotation, users decide to disclose personal data in
order to receive, in exchange, a certain beneﬁt. This earned value can
be quantiﬁed in terms of the customised experience of a certain product
[6]. For such a recommendation system to work, and successfully pro-
pose items of interest, user preferences need to be revealed and made
accessible partially or in full, and thus exposed to possible privacy
attacks.
When a user expresses and shares their interests by annotating a set
of items, these resources and their categorisationwill be part of their ac-
tivity. The recorded users' activities will allow the used platform to
“know more” about each of them, and therefore suggesting over time
useful resources. These could be items similar to others tagged in the
past, or simply close to the set of preferences expressed in their proﬁle.
In order to protect their privacy, a user could refrain from expressing
their preferences altogether. While in this case an attacker would not
be able to build a proﬁle of the user in question, it would also become
impossible for the service provider to deliver a personalised experience:
the user would then achieve the maximum level of privacy protection,
but also the worst level of utility.
Various and numerous approaches have been proposed to protect
user privacy by also preserving the recommendation utility in the con-
text of social tagging platform. These approaches can be grouped
around fourmain strategies [7]: encryption-basedmethods, approaches
based on trusted third parties (TTPs), collaborative mechanisms and
data-perturbative techniques. In traditional approaches to privacy,
users or application designers decide whether certain sensitive infor-
mation is to be disclosed or not.While the unavailability of this data, tra-
ditionally attained by means of access control or encryption, produces
the highest level of privacy, it would also limit access to particular con-
tent or functionalities. This would be the case of a user freely annotating
items on a social tagging platform. By adopting traditional PETs, the pro-
ﬁle of this user could bemade available only to the service providers, but
kept completely or partially hidden from their network of social connec-
tions on the platform. This approach would indeed limit the chances of
an attacker proﬁling the user, but would, unfortunately, prevent them
from receiving content suggested by their community.
A conceptually simple approach to protecting user privacy consists
in a TTP acting as an intermediary or anonymiser between the user
and an untrusted information system. In this scenario, the system can-
not know the user ID, but merely the identity of the TTP involved in
the communication. Alternatively, the TTP may act as a pseudonymiserby supplying a pseudonym ID′ to the service provider, but only the
TTP knows the correspondence between the pseudonym ID′ and the ac-
tual user ID. In online social networks, the use of either approachwould
not be entirely feasible as users of these networks are required to
authenticate to login. Although the adoption of TTPs in the manner de-
scribedmust, therefore, be ruled out, the users could provide a pseudo-
nym at the sign-up process. In this regard, some sites have started
offering social-networking services where users are not required to re-
veal their real identiﬁers. Social Number [8] is an example of such net-
works, where users must choose a unique number as their ID.
Unfortunately, none of these approaches effectively prevents an at-
tacker fromproﬁling a user based on the annotated items content, and ul-
timately inferring their real identity. This could be accomplished in the
case of a user posting related content across different platforms, making
them vulnerable to techniques based on the ideas of reidentiﬁcation. As
an example, suppose that an observer has access to certain behavioural
patterns of online activity associated with a user, who occasionally dis-
closes their ID, possibly during interactions not involving sensitive data.
The same user could attempt to hide under a pseudonym ID′ to exchange
information of conﬁdential nature. Nevertheless, if the user exhibited
similar behavioural patterns, the unlinkability between ID and ID′ could
be compromised through the exploitable similarity between these pat-
terns. In this case, any past proﬁling inferences carried out by the pseudo-
nym ID′would be linked to the actual user ID.
A particularly rich group of PETs resort to users collaborating to pro-
tect their privacy. One of themost popular is Crowds [9], which assumes
that a set of userswanting to browse theWebmay collaborate to submit
their requests. Precisely, a user wishing to send a request to aWeb serv-
er selects ﬁrst a member of the group at random, and then forwards the
request to them. When this member receives the request, it ﬂips a bi-
ased coin to determine whether to forward this request to another
member or to submit it directly to the Web server. This process is re-
peated until the request is ﬁnally relayed to the intended destination.
As a result of this probabilistic protocol, the Web server and any of the
members forwarding the request cannot ascertain the identity of the ac-
tual sender, that is, the member who initiated the request.
We consider collaborative protocols [10–12] like Crowds, not suit-
able for the application addressed in this work although theymay be ef-
fective in applications such as information retrieval and Web search.
Themain reason is that users are required to be logged into online social
tagging platforms. That is, users participating in a collaborative protocol
would need the credentials of their peers to log in, and post on their be-
half, which in practice would be unacceptable. Besides, even if users
were willing to share their credentials, this would not entirely avoid
proﬁling based on the observation of the resources annotated.
In the case of perturbative methods for recommendation systems,
[13] proposes that users add random values to their ratings and then
submit these perturbed ratings to the recommender. When the system
has received these ratings, it executes an algorithm and sends the users
some information that allows them to compute the ﬁnal prediction
themselves. When the number of participating users is sufﬁciently
large, the authors ﬁnd that user privacy is protected to some degree,
and the system reaches an acceptable level of accuracy. However,
even though a usermay disguise all their ratings, merely showing inter-
est in an individual itemmay be just as revealing as the score assigned to
that item. For instance, a user rating a book called “How to Overcome
Depression” indicates a clear interest in depression, regardless of the
score assigned to this book. Apart from this critique, other works [14,
15] stress that the use of certain randomised data-distortion techniques
might not be able to preserve privacy completely in the long run.
In line with these two latter works, [16] applies the same
perturbative technique to collaborative ﬁltering algorithms based on
singular-value decomposition, focusing on the impact that their tech-
nique has on privacy. For this purpose, they use the privacy metric pro-
posed by Agrawal, and Aggarwal, [17], effectively a normalised version
of the mutual information between the original and the perturbed
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[18] and Jester [19]. The results show the trade-off curve between accu-
racy in recommendations and privacy. In particular, theymeasure accu-
racy as the mean absolute error between the predicted values from the
original ratings and the predictions obtained from the perturbed
ratings.
The approach considered in this study follows the idea of perturbing
the information implicitly or explicitly disclosed by the user. It, there-
fore, represents a possible alternative to hinder an attacker in their ef-
forts to proﬁle their activity precisely, when using a personalised
service. The submission of false user data, together with genuine data,
is an illustrative example of data-perturbative mechanism. In the con-
text of information retrieval, query forgery [2] prevents privacy at-
tackers from proﬁling users accurately based on the content of queries,
without having to trust the service provider or the network operator,
but obviously at the cost of trafﬁc overhead. In this kind ofmechanisms,
the perturbation itself typically takes place on the user side. This
means that users do not need to trust any external entity such as the
recommender, the ISP or their neighbouring peers. Naturally, this does
not signify that data perturbation cannot be used in combination with
other third-party based approaches or mechanisms relying on user
collaboration.
Certainly, the distortion of user proﬁles for privacy protection may
be done not only by means of the insertion of false activity, but also by
suppression. An example of this latter kind of data perturbation may
be found in Parra et al. [20], where the authors propose the elimination
of tags as a privacy-enhancing strategy in the context of the semantic
Web. This strategy allows users to preserve their privacy to a certain de-
gree, but it comes at the cost of a degradation in the semantic function-
ality of the Web. Precisely, Parra et al. [21] investigates mathematically
the privacy-utility trade-off posed by the suppression of tags,measuring
privacy as the Shannon entropy of the perturbed proﬁle, and utility as
the percentage of tags users are willing to eliminate. Closely related to
this work is also another study of Parra et al. [22], where the impact of
tag suppression is assessed experimentally in the context of a parental
control application, in terms of percentages regarding missing tags on
resources on the one hand, and in terms of false positives and negatives
on the other.3. Adversary model
Users tagging online and ofﬂine resources generate what is has been
called a folksonomy, that is, a set composed by all the users that have
expressed at least a tag, the tags that have been used and the items
that have been described through them. Formally, a folksonomy F
can be deﬁned as a tuple F ¼ T ;U; I ;Af g , where T ¼ t1;…; tLf g is
the set of tags, or more generally tag categories, which comprise the vo-
cabulary expressed by the folksonomy; U ¼ u1;…;uMf g is the set of
users that have expressed at least a tag; I = {i1, …, iN} is the set of
items that have been tagged; and A ¼ um; tl; inð Þ∈ U  T  If g is the
set of annotations of each tag category tl to an item in by a user um [5].
As we shall see in Section 3.1, our user-proﬁle model will rely on
categorising tags into categories of interest. This will provide a certain
mathematical tractability of the user proﬁle while at the same time
allowing for a classiﬁcation of the user interests into macro semantic
topics.
In our scenario users assign tags to online resources according to
their preferences, taste or needs. It follows thatwhile theuser is contrib-
uting to categorise a speciﬁc content through their tags, hence adding
semantic information to the whole folksonomy, their activity is reveal-
ing something regarding their interests, reducing their privacy overall.
We assume that the set of potential privacy attackers includes any
entity capable of capturing the information users convey to a social tag-
ging platform. Accordingly, both service providers and network opera-
tors are deemed potential attackers. However, since tags are oftenpublicly available to other users of the tagging platform, any entity
able to collect this information is also taken into consideration in our ad-
versary model.
In our model, we suppose that the privacy attacker aims at proﬁling
users through their expressed preferences, speciﬁcally on the basis of
the tags posted. Throughout this work, we shall consider that the objec-
tive of this proﬁling activity is to individuate users, meaning that the at-
tackerwishes to ﬁnduserswhose preferences signiﬁcantly diverge from
the interests of the whole population of users. This assumption is in line
with other works in the literature [4,23,24].
3.1. Modelling the user/item proﬁles
A tractable model of the user proﬁle as a probability mass function
(PMF) is proposed in [20–23] to express how each tag contributes to ex-
pose howmany times the user has expressed a preference toward a spe-
ciﬁc category of interest. This model follows the intuitive assumption
that a particular category is weighted according to the number of
times this has been used in the user or item proﬁle.
Exactly as in those works, we deﬁne the proﬁle of a user um as the
PMF pm = (pm,1,…, pm,L), conceptually a histogram of relative frequen-
cies of tags across the set of tag categories T . More formally, in terms of
the notation introduced at the beginning of Section 3, the l-th compo-
nent of such proﬁle is deﬁned as
pm;l ¼
um; tl; ið Þ∈Aji∈If gj j
um; t; ið Þ∈Ajt∈T ; i∈If gj j
:
Similarly, we deﬁne the proﬁle of an item in as the PMF qn =
(qn,1,…, qn,L), where qn,l is the percentage of tags belonging to the cate-
gory lwhich have been assigned to this item. Both user and itemproﬁles
can then be seen as normalised histograms of tags across categories of
interest. Our proﬁle model is in this extent equivalent to the tag clouds
that numerous collaborative tagging services use to visualise which tags
are being posted, collaboratively or individually by each user. A tag
cloud, similarly to a histogram, is a visual representation in which tags
are weighted according to their relevance. Fig. 1a shows an example
of user proﬁle.
In viewof the assumptionsdescribed in the previous section, our pri-
vacy attacker boils down to an entity that aims to proﬁle users by
representing their interests in the form of normalised histograms, on
the basis of a given categorisation. To achieve this objective, the attacker
exploits the tags that users communicate to social tagging systems. This
work assumes that users are willing to submit false tags to mitigate the
risk of proﬁling. In doing so, users gain some privacy, although at the
cost of certain loss in usability. As a result of this, the attacker observes
a perturbed version of the genuine user proﬁle, also in the form of a rel-
ative histogram, which does not reﬂect the actual interests of the user.
In short, the attacker believes that the observed behaviour characterises
the actual user's proﬁle.
Thereafter, we shall refer to these two proﬁles as the actual user pro-
ﬁle p and the apparent user proﬁle t.
3.2. Privacy metric
In this section, we propose and justify an information-theoretic
quantity as a measure of user privacy in social tagging systems. For
the readers not familiarwith information theory, nextwe brieﬂy review
two key concepts.
Recall [25] that Shannon's entropy H(p) of a discrete random vari-
able (r.v.) with PMF p= (pi)i = 1L on the alphabet {1,…, L} is a measure
of the uncertainty of the outcome of this r.v., deﬁned as
H pð Þ ¼−
X
pi log pi:
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(a) Example of user profile expressed as a
PMF across a set of tag categories.
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(b) Profile of the whole population of users in our dataset.
Fig. 1.Wemodel user and item proﬁles as normalised histograms of tags across a set of predeﬁned categories of interest.
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the Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence is deﬁned as
D pkqð Þ ¼
X
pi log
pi
qi
:
The KL divergence is often referred to as relative entropy, as it may be
regarded as a generalisation of the Shannon entropy of a distribution,
relative to another.
Having reviewed the concepts of entropy and relative entropy, we
deﬁne the initial privacy risk as the KL divergence between the user's
genuine proﬁle p and the population's tag distribution p, that is,
R0 ¼ D pkpð Þ:
Similarly, we deﬁne the (ﬁnal) privacy riskR as the KL divergence
between the user's apparent proﬁle t and the population's distribution,
R ¼ D tkpð Þ:
Next, we justify the Shannon entropy and the KL divergence asmea-
sures of privacy when an attacker aims to individuate users based
on their tag proﬁles. The rationale behind the use of these two
information-theoretic quantities as privacy metrics is documented in
greater detail in [4].
Leveraging on a celebrated information-theoretic rationale by Jaynes
[26], the Shannon entropy of an apparent user proﬁle may be regarded
as ameasure of privacy, ormore accurately, anonymity. The leading idea
is that the method of types from information theory establishes an ap-
proximate monotonic relationship between the likelihood of a PMF in
a stochastic system and its entropy. Loosely speaking and in our context,
the higher the entropy of a proﬁle, the more likely it is, and the more
users behave according to it. Under this interpretation, entropy is a
measure of anonymity, although not in the sense that the user's identity
remains unknown. Entropy has, therefore, the meaning that the higher
likelihood of an apparent proﬁle can help the user go unnoticed. In fact,
the apparent user proﬁlemakes the usermore typical to an external ob-
server, and hopefully, less attractive to an attacker whose objective is to
target peculiar users.
If an aggregated histogram of the population is available as a
reference proﬁle, aswe assume in this work, the extension of Jaynes' ar-
gument to relative entropy also gives an acceptable measure of ano-
nymity. The KL divergence is a measure of discrepancy between
probability distributions, which includes Shannon's entropy as the par-
ticular case when the reference distribution is uniform. Conceptually, alower KL divergence hides discrepancies with respect to a reference
proﬁle, say the population's proﬁle. Also, a monotonic relationship be-
tween the likelihood of a distribution and its divergence with respect
to the reference distribution of choice exists. This aspect enables us to
deemKL divergence as ameasure of anonymity in a sense entirely anal-
ogous to the abovementioned.
Under this interpretation, the KL divergence is, therefore, inter-
preted as an (inverse) indicator of the commonness of similar proﬁles
in said population. As such,we should hasten to stress that the KL diver-
gence is a measure of anonymity rather than privacy. The obfuscated
information is the uniqueness of the proﬁle behind the online activity,
rather than the actual proﬁle. Indeed, a proﬁle of interests already
matching the population's would not require perturbation.
3.3. Privacy-enhancing techniques
Among a variety of PETs, this work focuses on those technologies
that rely on the principle of tag forgery. The key strengths of such tag-
perturbation technique are its simplicity in terms of infrastructure re-
quirements and its strong privacy guarantees, as users need not trust
the social tagging platform, nor the network operator nor other peers.
In conceptual terms, tag forgery is a PET that may help users tagging
online resources to protect their privacy. It consists of the simple idea
that users may be willing to tag items that are unknown to them and
that do not reﬂect their actual preferences, in order to appear as similar
as possible to the average population proﬁle. A simple example of such
technique can be illustrated by thinking to a speciﬁc thematic commu-
nity, such that of a group of individuals interested in jazz music. In
this scenario if a user is particularly interested in rock music, their pro-
ﬁle could be easily spotted and identiﬁed, as they would probably ex-
press interest towards artists and tracks that could be categorised
outside of the jazz category.
When a user wishes to apply tag forgery, ﬁrst they must specify a
tag-forgery rate ρ ∈ [0, 1]. This rate represents the ratio of forged tags
to total tags the user is disposed to submit. Based on this parameter
and exactly as in [2],we deﬁne theuser's apparent tag proﬁle as the con-
vex combination t = (1 − ρ)p + ρ r. Here r is some forgery strategy
modelling the percentage of tags that the user should forge in each tag
category. Clearly, any forgery strategy must satisfy that ri ≥ 0 for all i
and that∑ri = ρ.
In thiswork,we consider three different forgery strategies, which re-
sult in three implementations of tag forgery, namely, optimised tag forg-
ery [2], the popular TMNmechanism [3] and a uniform tag forgery. The
optimised tag forgery corresponds to choosing the strategy r* that
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r ¼ arg min
r
D 1−ρð Þpþ ρr pkð Þ:
Please note that this formulation of optimised tag forgery relies on
the appropriateness of the criteria optimised, which in turn depends
on a number of factors. These are: the speciﬁc application scenario
and the tag statistics of the users; the actual network and processing
over-head incurred by introducing forged tags; the assumption that
the tag-forgery rate ρ is a faithful representation of the degradation in
recommendation quality; the adversarial model and the mechanisms
against privacy contemplated.
The TMN mechanism is described next. Said mechanism is a soft-
ware implementation of query forgery developed as a Web browser
add-on. It exploits the idea of generating false queries to a search engine
in order to avoid user proﬁling from the latter. TMN is designed as a
client-side software, speciﬁcally a browser add-on, independent from
centralised infrastructure or third-party services for its operation. In
the client software, a mechanism deﬁned dynamic query lists has
been implemented. Each instance of TMN is programmed to create an
initial seed list of query terms that will be used to compute the ﬁrst
ﬂow of decoys searches. The initial list of keywords is built from a set
of RSS feeds from popular websites, mainly news sites, and it is com-
bined with a second list of popular query words gathered from recently
searched terms.When TMN is ﬁrst enabled, and the user sends an actual
search query, TMN intercepts the HTTP response returned from the
search engine, and extracts suitable query-like terms that will be used
to create the forged searches. Furthermore, the provided list of RSS
feeds is queried randomly to substitute keywords in the list of seeds
[27].
Because TMN sends arbitrary keywords as search queries, the user
proﬁle resulting from this forgery strategy is completely random [28].
Although the user possesses the ability to add or remove RSS feeds
that the extension will use to construct their bogus queries, there is no
possible way to control which actual keywords are chosen. Moreover,
the user has no control on the random keywords that are included in
the bursts of bogus queries, since these are extracted from the HTTP re-
sponse received from the actual searches that the user has performed.
While TMN is a technique designed to forge search queries, we have im-
plemented a TMN-like agent generating bogus tags. To initialise our
TMN-like agent we have considered an initial list of seed using RSS
feeds from popular news sites, the sites included were the same ones
that TMN uses in its built-in list of feeds. By querying the RSS feeds, a
list of keywords was extracted. Hence, using the extracted keywords a
distribution of tags into eleven categories was constructed, these eleven
categories correspond to theﬁrst taxonomy levels of theOpenDirectory
Project (ODP) classiﬁcation scheme [29]. The proﬁle obtained with this
technique has then been assumed as a reference to implement a TMN
agent and is denoted by the distribution w.
Last but not least, the proposed uniform tag forgery strategy is con-
structed similarly to TMN. We have in fact supposed a TMN agent thatTable 1
Summary of the tag-forgery strategies under study. In this work, we investigate three var-
iations of a data-perturbative mechanism that consists of annotating false tags. The
optimised tag forgery implementation corresponds to the strategy that minimises the pri-
vacy risk for a given forgery rate. The TMN-like approach generates false tags according to
the popular privacy-preserving mechanism TrackMeNot [3]. The uniform approach con-
siders the uniform distribution as forgery strategy.
Tag-forgery implementation Forgery strategy r
Optimised [2] arg minrD 1−ρð Þpþ ρ r pkð Þ
TMN [3] w (TMN distribution)
Uniform u (uniform distribution)would send disguise tags created according to a uniform distribution
across all categories. More speciﬁcally, in the uniform forgery strategy
we have that r= u. Table 1 summarises the tag-forgery strategies con-
sidered here.
3.4. Similarity metric
A recommender, or a recommendation system, can be described as
an information-ﬁltering system that seeks to predict the rating or pref-
erence that a user would give to an item. For the purpose of our study,
the idea of rating a resource or expressing a preference has been consid-
ered as the action of tagging an item. This assumption follows the idea
that a user will most likely tag a resource if they happen to be interested
in this resource.
In the ﬁeld of recommendations systems, we may distinguish three
main approaches to item recommendation: content-based, user-based
and collaborative ﬁltering [30]. In content-based ﬁltering items are
compared based on a measure of similarity. The assumption behind
this strategy is that items similar to those a user has already tagged in
the past would be considered more relevant by the individual in ques-
tion. If in fact a user has been tagging resources in certain categories
with more frequency, it is more probable that they would also annotate
items belonging to the same categories.
In user-based ﬁltering, users are compared with other users based
again on a deﬁned measure of similarity. It is supposed, in this case,
that if two or more users have similar interests, i.e., they have been ex-
pressing preference in resources in similar categories, items that are
useful for one of them can also be signiﬁcant for the others.
Collaborativeﬁltering employs both a combination of the techniques
described before as well as the collective actions of a group or network
of users and their social relationships [31]. In collaborativeﬁltering then,
not only the tags and categories that have been attached to a certain
items are considered, but also what are called item-speciﬁc metadata
are taken into account, these could be the item title or summary, or
other content-related information [32].
In the coming sections, we shall use a generic content-based ﬁltering
algorithm [33] to evaluate the three variations of tag forgery described
in Section 3.3.
We have chosen a content-based recommender because this class of
algorithms models users and items as histograms of tags, which is es-
sentially the model assumed for our adversary 3.1. Loosely speaking a
content-based recommendation system is composed of: a proper tech-
nique for representing the items and users' proﬁles, and a strategy to
compare items and users, and produce a recommendation. The ﬁeld of
content recommendation is particularly vast and developed in the liter-
ature and its applications are numerous. Recommendation systems in
fact span different topics in computer science, information retrieval
and artiﬁcial intelligence.
For the scope of this job we are only concentrating on applying a
suitable measure of similarity within items and users' proﬁles. The rec-
ommendation algorithm we have implemented therefore aims to ﬁnd
items that are closer to a particular user proﬁle (i.e., more similar).
Three common measurement of similarity between objects are usually
considered in the literature. These are namely: Euclidean distance, Pear-
son correlation and cosine similarity [34].
The Euclidean distance is the simplest andmost common example of
a distance measure. The Pearson correlation is instead a measurement
of the linear relationship between objects.While there are certainly dif-
ferent correlation coefﬁcients that have been considered and applied,
the Pearson correlation is among the most commonly used.
Cosine similarity is another very common approach. It considers
items as document vectors of an n-dimensional space and computes
their similarity as the cosine of the angle that they form. We have ap-
plied this approach in our study.
More speciﬁcally, we have considered a cosine-based similarity [35]
as a measure of distance between a user proﬁle and an item proﬁle. The
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vectors which is widely used in content-based recommenders. Hence
if pm = (pm,1, …, pm,L) is the proﬁle of user um and qn = (qn,1, …, qn,L)
is the proﬁle of item in, the cosine similarity between these two proﬁles
is deﬁned as
s pm; qnð Þ ¼
X
l
pm;l qn;lﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃX
l
p2m;l
q ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃX
l
q2n;l
q :
3.5. Utility metric
A utility metric is being introduced in order to evaluate the perfor-
mances of the recommender and understand how these degrade with
the application of a speciﬁc PET. Prediction accuracy is among the
most debated property in the literature regarding recommendation sys-
tems. For the purpose of this work it is assumed that a system providing
on averagemore accurate recommendation of itemswould be preferred
by the user. Furthermore the system is evaluated considering a content
retrieval scenario where a user is provided with a ranked list of N rec-
ommended items, hence performances are evaluated in terms of rank-
ing based metrics used in the Information Retrieval ﬁeld of study [36].
The performancemetric adopted is therefore among themost common-
ly used for ranked list prediction, i.e., precision at top V results. In the
ﬁeld of information retrieval, precision can be deﬁned as the fraction
of recommended items that are relevant for a target user [37]. If the rec-
ommendation system evaluated retrieves V items, the previously de-
ﬁned ratio is precision at top V or P@V. Precision at top V is then a
metric that measures how many relevant documents the user will ﬁnd
in the ranked list of results. The overall performance value is then calcu-
lated by averaging the results over the set of all available users. Consid-
ering a likely scenario, forwhich a user would be presentedwith a list of
top-V results that the system has considered most similar to their pro-
ﬁle, we have evaluated precision of the recommender in two possible
situations: with V= 30 in one case and V= 50 in the other.Fig. 2. The proposed architecture of a communication module managing the user data ﬂows4. Architecture
In this section, we present an architecture of a communicationmod-
ule for the protection of user proﬁles in social tagging systems (Fig. 2).
We consider the case in which a user would retrieve items from a social
tagging platform, and would occasionally submit annotations in the
form of ratings or tags to the resource they would ﬁnd interesting.
This would be the case of a user browsing resources on StumbleUpon,
tagging bookmarks on Delicious or exploring photos on Flickr. The
social taggingplatformwould suggestweb resources through its recom-
mendation system that would gradually learn about the user interest,
hence trying to suggest items more related to the user expressed
preferences.
While theuserwould normally read the suggested documents, these
would also be intercepted by the communication module, running as a
software on the user space. This can be imagined as a browser extension
analysing the communication between the user and the social tagging
platform under consideration.
More generally, the communication module can be envisioned as a
proxy or a ﬁrewall, i.e., a component between the user and the outside
internet, responsible for ﬁltering and managing the communication
ﬂows that the user generates.While the userwould browse the internet
the communication module would be in sleepingmode, and it could be
turned on at the user's discretion only when visiting certain social tag-
ging platforms. It is assumed that while the user would surf a certain
platform, eventually annotating resources that they ﬁnd relevant, they
would receive and generate a stream of data, or more speciﬁcally a
data ﬂow. This is composed of the resources that the platform is sending
to the user in the form of recommendation and of those that the user is
sending back to the platform in the form of tagged items.
These data ﬂows are analysed in the communication module by a
component, the population proﬁle constructor, and used to build a pop-
ulation proﬁle of reference. We have supposed that these data streams
would probably contain annotations that would help themodule proﬁl-
ing the average population of users, together with other informationwith a social tagging platform and implementing different possible forgery algorithms.
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would contain speciﬁc, pre-compiled proﬁles, corresponding to particu-
lar population that the user would consider either safe or generic.
The user generated stream of data instead, composed by each anno-
tated item, would be feeding the user proﬁle constructor. This compo-
nent would keep track of the actual expressed user preferences and
feed this data into the forgery controller.
At this point the forgery controller would calculate a forgery strate-
gy, that at the user discretion is either applied or not to the stream of
tagged resources, and that would be sent to the social tagging platform,
as the ﬂow of data comprising the user activity. If the user kept the com-
munication module on its off state, no forgery would modify the docu-
ments sent to the social tagging service, otherwise a certain stream of
annotations would be computed and applied to certain resources.
This means that according to the strategy and a forgery rate that the
user has chosen, the forgery controller would produce a number of
bogus tags to certain items. These would be sent to the social tagging
platform together with the actual user annotations. The user would
hence present to the platformnot their real proﬁle, but an apparent pro-
ﬁle t resulting from both their real activity and the forged categorisation
stream.
4.1. Further considerations
Wewould like to stress the fact that at the centre of our approach is
the user. The communicationmodule can in fact be used either to calcu-
late a forgery strategy, or to simply warn the user when their privacy
risk reaches a certain threshold. At this point the userwould be present-
ed with a possible forgery strategy and eventually are set of keywords
and resources that could be used to produce bogus tags. We are aware
that a mechanism generating tags could eventually produce a strategy
introducing sensible topics in the user proﬁle. We have, therefore, ad-
dressed this situation by using exclusively a curated list of websites
andnews portalswhose content can be considered safe. In addition key-
words in categories considered sensible could be excluded, either auto-
matically or by the users. In our architecture is the user who ultimately
decides whether to follow the recommendations proposed by our com-
munication module or not.
Additionally, it is worth mentioning that, if the user decided to re-
duce excessively the number of categories used to produce a possible
forgery strategy, their user proﬁle would inevitably exhibits a spike in
activity in the chosen categories. As a consequence, the apparent user
proﬁle would probably becomemore identiﬁable to an external attack-
er. We therefore believe that although the user should be allowed to
tweak their forgery strategy, they should also be informed of the conse-
quences of applying some settings instead of others to the communica-
tion module.
We have also considered the possibility to implement our proposed
architecture as a mobile application. We are aware this might add a
computational, and networking overhead on the platform where
the module will be installed, yet we also believe that in modern
mobile platforms and personal computers this shall not be an issue.
More importantly we believe that the beneﬁt of controlling the user
perceived proﬁle shall overcome the cost of implementing the proposed
architecture.
Proﬁle data are in fact collected not only by social tagging platforms
but also by websites, web applications and third parties even when the
user is not connected to a personal account. Through tracking technolo-
gies and a network of afﬁliated web sites users can be followed online
and their footprint collected for a variety of uses. If aggregated, these
data could reveal more over time that the same users initially intended.
The data then turn from merely ﬁgures to piece of information able to
describe users' identity and behaviours. Social engineering attacks
could exploit users' proﬁles on different social networks to gather cer-
tain sensitive information. Similarly users' proﬁles crawling across dif-
ferent services and applications can disclose relevant facts about theusers. It is, therefore, important for users to maintain a desired online
privacy strategy. At the same time, this approach could also be imple-
mented by developers and systems architects who need to be aware
of the possible privacy and security implication of their work.
5. Evaluation
Evaluating how a recommender systemwould be affected when tag
forgery is applied in a real world scenario is interesting for a different
range of applications. We have particularly considered both the point
of view of the privacy researcher interested in understanding how
user privacy can be preserved, and also the perspective of an application
developer willing to provide users with accurate recommendation re-
garding content and resources available on their platform.
Every PETmust in fact ensure whether the semantic loss incurred in
order to protect private data can be acceptable for practical use.
Thus, different tag forgery strategies were considered in a scenario
where all theuserswerewilling to apply the techniques. Itwas also con-
sidered that a user would try to apply a certain technique at different
forgery rates, in order to evaluate howutilitywould be affected on aver-
age at each rate. When forgery rate is equal to zero it means the tech-
nique is not applied.
Hence, the overall utility for the recommender system, based on the
applied forgery rate was evaluated against the privacy risk reduction
calculated after each step.
In our simulated scenario, a user would ideally implement a possible
PET at a time. We have therefore considered what percentage of utility
the hypothetical user would lose when incrementing the ratio of forged
tags with each strategy, consequently underlining what percentage of
privacy risk reduction has gained in front of a certain loss in utility.
The user in this setup is presented over timewith a list of top results,
they would then decide to click or not on a number of these resources.
This number divided by the total number of results gives us the percent-
age of items that the user has actually found interesting. Our utilitymet-
ric is then evaluated considering the cases for which the user has been
presented with the top 30 results, and the top 50 results.
Note that since in our experimental setting, we have split the data
into a testing and a training set [5,38], considering relevant only the
items in the user's proﬁle, it is not possible to evaluate items that are
as yet unknown to the user but that could also be considered relevant
(Fig. 3). In a real world application in fact, a user could be presented
with results that are unknown to them, but that do reﬂect their
expressed interests. Therefore our estimation of precision is in fact an
underestimation [39].
In order to evaluate the impact of a determined PET on the quality of
the recommendation, and elaborate a study of the relationship between
privacy and utility, a dataset rich in collaborative tagging information
was needed. Considering different social bookmarking platforms, Deli-
cious was identiﬁed as a representative system. Delicious is a social
bookmarking platform for web resources [1]. The dataset containing
Delicious data was obtained from the ones publicly available at the
2nd International Workshop on Information Heterogeneity and Fusion
in Recommender Systems [40], accessible on http://ir.ii.uam.es/
hetrec2011/datasets.html, and kindly hosted by GroupLens research
group at University of Minnesota. Furthermore, the dataset also
contained category information about their items, this corresponds to
the ﬁrst and second taxonomy levels of the ODP classiﬁcation scheme
(Table 2) [29]. TheODP project, nowDMOZ, is the largest, most compre-
hensive human-edited directory of the Web, constructed and main-
tained by a passionate, global community of volunteer editors.
The chosen dataset speciﬁcally contains activity on themost popular
tags in Delicious, the bookmarks tagged with those tags, and the users
that tagged each bookmark. Starting from this speciﬁc set of users, the
dataset also exhibits their contacts and contacts' contacts activity.
Therefore it both covers a broad range of document topics while also
presenting a dense social network [29].
Fig. 3. Experimental methodology.
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dataset is randomly divided between two subsets, namely a testing
and a training set. The training set contains 80% of the items for each
user, and was used to build the users' proﬁles. The testing set contained
the remaining 20% of the items tagged by each user, andwas considered
to evaluate (test) the recommender itself.
The ﬁrst step of the experiment involved obtaining a metric of
the recommender performance without applying any PET. TheTable 2
Statistics regarding delicious dataset.
Statistics about the built dataset
Categories 11 Users 1867
Item-category tuples 98,998 Avg. tags per user 477.75
Items 69,226 Avg. items per category 81,044
Avg. categories per item 1.4 Tags per item 13.06recommender would then produce estimation of how relevant an
item potentially is for a user, by comparing the calculated user proﬁle
with each proﬁle of the items in the testing set. This step would return
a list of top items for each user. At this point our precision metric is cal-
culated by verifyingwhich of the top V items have actually being tagged
by each user. This process is repeated at each value of ρ to understand
how applying a different PET affects the prediction performances of a
simple recommendation system. Please note that the three different
PET have been considered independently for one another, i.e., the
users would apply one of the techniques at a time and not a strategy in-
volving a combination of the three.
5.1. Experimental results
In our experimental setup, we have ﬁrstly evaluated what level of
privacy userswill reach implementing each of the strategies considered.
Fig. 4a shows how the application of the different PETs at different
values of ρ affects the privacy riskR.
Fig. 4. For the optimised forgery strategy the privacy riskR decreases with ρ. Naturally for ρ=0 the privacy risk for all the users applying a technique is actually maximum, while it will
approach 0% when ρ= 1. The graph shows how the optimised tag forgery strategy allows users to reduce more rapidly their privacy risk even for small values or ρ. This conﬁrms the
intuitive assumption that applying a forgery strategy that actually modiﬁes the user's apparent proﬁle to increase its divergence from the average population proﬁle, would produce
the unfavourable result to make the user activity more easily recognised from a possible passive observer.
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privacy riskR is affected by the application of a certain PET. For values
of ρ∈ [0, 0.25] (Fig. 6a),R is decreasing for all three strategies, although
with optimised forgery this seem to be happening faster.
When larger values of ρ are considered, the apparent user proﬁle
will most likely mimic the proﬁle of either the population distribution,
in the case of optimised forgery, the TMN distribution in the case of
TMN and the uniform distribution in the case of uniform forgery. If we
consider this apparent effect, we understand why, while the privacy
risk approaches 0 in the case of optimised forgery, it actually increases
both for TMN and uniform forgery (Fig. 4a). Recalling that our privacy
metric, and adversary model, consider the case for which a possible at-
tacker would try to isolate a certain user from the rest of the population,
applying a forgery strategy that would generate an apparent proﬁle t
thatwould increase the divergence froman average proﬁle, would actu-
ally result in making the user more easily identiﬁed from a possible
observer.Fig. 5. Average value of utility P@ calculated for different values of ρ, representing how applyin
recommendation system, hence the user utility function. It is important to note that themeasur
glitches in the function that we can see attenuated if presenting each user with a larger list ofThis undesirable consequence is alsomore eloquently present when
applying the uniform strategy, in fact as the user apparent proﬁle
approached the uniform distribution for higher values of ρ, it would be-
come evident to an external observer which users are forging their tags
according to this strategy.
In the case of optimised forgery instead, privacy risk decreases with
ρ. Naturally for ρ= 0 the privacy risk for all the users applying a tech-
nique is actually maximum, while it will approach 0% when ρ = 1. It
is particularly interesting to see how our optimised tag forgery strategy
allows users to reduce their privacy risk more rapidly even for small
values or ρ.
We have therefore measured the total number of users that would
actually increase their privacy risk as a consequence of having applied
a certain PET (Fig. 7). It is surprisingly striking to observe how almost
90% of the total number of users, when applying TMN or uniform forg-
ery, would make their apparent proﬁle more recognisable thanwithout
implementing any PET. This reﬂects the intuitive assumption that ing a certain tag forgery strategy with a determined forgery rate affects the performance of a
e of utility averaged across the user population is affected by statistical noise creating some
results to choose from.
Fig. 6. It is interesting to note the ratio between the privacy riskR and the utility loss only for small values of ρ.
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ered throughout this work, it would be advisable to make it as close as
possible to an average proﬁle of reference, so that it is not possible to in-
dividuate it, or in other words to distinguish it from the average popu-
lation proﬁle.
We then have evaluated how our utility metric was affected by the
application of the tag forgery strategies, for different values of ρ. We
have considered two situations to evaluate our utility metric. In the
ﬁrst case the user would be presented with the top 30 results, and in
the secondwith the top 50. This allowed us, not only to evaluate the im-
pact of noise on themetric itself, but also to consider the impact of a cer-
tain strategy over longer series of results.
Fig. 5b and a, shows the obtained utility versus the rate of tag forgery
applied, this has been evaluated again for optimised forgery, uniform
forgery, and TMN strategy, in order to understand how these PETs per-
form in the described scenario.
In this casewe noticed how a uniform forgery strategy, which gener-
ates bogus tags according to a uniform distribution across all categories,
is able to better preserve utility than either optimised tag forgery or
TMN, especially for bigger forgery ratios.
What we found particularly relevant in our study is that for smaller
values of ρ, hence for a forgery rate up to 0.1, corresponding to a user
forging 10% of their tags, our optimised forgery strategy shows a privacy
risk reductionR of almost 34% opposed to a degradation in utility of 8%.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
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Fig. 7.Actual number of users increasing their privacy risk as a side effect of applying a cer-
tain strategy for a given value of ρ.This result is particularly representative of the intuition that it is possi-
ble to obtain a considerable increase in privacy, with a modest degrada-
tion of performance of the recommender system, or in other words a
limited utility loss (Fig. 6b).
The results obtained therefore present a scenario where applying a
tag forgery technique perturbs the proﬁle observed from the outside,
thus enabling users to protect their privacy, in exchange of a small se-
mantic loss if compared to the privacy risk reduction. The performance
degradation measured for the recommendation systems, is small if
compared to the privacy risk reduction obtained by the user when ap-
plying the forgery strategy considered.
6. Conclusions
Information ﬁltering systems that have been developed to predict
users' preferences, and eventually use the resulting predictions for dif-
ferent services, depend on users revealing their personal preferences
by annotating items that are relevant to them. At the same time, by re-
vealing their preferences online users are exposed to possible privacy
attacks and all sorts of proﬁling activities by legitimate and less legiti-
mate entities.
Query forgery arises, among different possible PETs, as a simple
strategy in terms of infrastructure requirements, as no third parties
or external entities need to be trusted by the user in order to be
implemented.
However, query forgery poses a trade-off between privacy and util-
ity. Measuring utility by computing the list of useful results that a user
would receive from a recommendation system, we have evaluated
how three possible tag forgery techniques would perform in a social
tag application. With this in mind a dataset for a real world application,
rich in collaborative tagging information has been considered.
Delicious provided a playground to calculate how the performance
of a recommendation system would be affected if all the users imple-
mented a tag forgery strategy. We have hence considered an adversary
model where a passive privacy attacker is trying to proﬁle a certain user.
The user in response, adopts a privacy strategy aiming at concealing
their actual preferences, minimising the divergence with the average
population proﬁle. The results presented show a compelling outcome
regarding how implementing different PETs can affect both user privacy
risk, as well as the overall recommendation utility.
We haveﬁrstly observed howwhile the privacy riskRdecreases ini-
tially, for smaller values of ρ (for both TMN and uniform forgery), it in-
creases as bigger forgery ratios are considered. This is because the
implied techniques actuallymodify the apparent user proﬁle to increase
27S. Puglisi et al. / Computer Standards & Interfaces 41 (2015) 17–27its divergence from the average population proﬁle. This actually makes
the user activity more easily recognised from a possible passive observ-
er. On the other hand, optimised forgery has been designed tominimise
the divergence between the user and the population proﬁle, therefore
the effect described is not observed in this case.
Considering this unfavourable effect, we have computed the number
of users that would actually increase their privacy risk. This particular
result showed how applying a certain PET could actually be detrimental
to the user's privacy: if the user implemented a strategy that is not accu-
rately chosen, they would be exposed to a higher privacy risk than the
one measured before applying the PET. Observing how the application
of a PET affects utility, we have found out that especially for a small
forgery rate (up to 20%) it is possible to obtain a consistent increase
in privacy, or privacy risk reduction, against a small degradation of
utility. This reﬂects the intuition that users would be able to receive
personalised services while also being able to reasonably protect their
privacy and their proﬁles from possible attackers.
This study furthermore shows in a simple experimental evaluation,
of a real world application scenario, how the performance degradation
of a recommendation system, is small if compared to the privacy risk re-
duction offered by the application of these techniques. This opensmany
possibilities and paths that need to be explored to better understand the
relationship between privacy and utility in recommendation systems. In
particular it would be interesting to explore other deﬁnitions of the
metrics proposed and apply these on different class of recommendation
systems.
As future research lines, we shall investigate how other information
ﬁlteringmodels are affected by the application of certain PET. Speciﬁcal-
lywe shall consider researching howdifferent aspects of users' activities
are categorised and proﬁled by information ﬁltering systems, and what
counter-measures can be taken to protect user privacy.
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